The Ideology of the Other: an Inspection of Group Alliances and Ideologies
in *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*

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Abstract

Works of art, no matter how intriguing in their simulation of reality, must reflect the ideological background and systems of belief of their creators. If the work is written to bear witness to epoch changing events, then the reading through the ideologies it adheres to or dispenses with is necessary to arrive at a better and more profound understanding of the forces at work and a more valid assessment of the corollaries. Lawrence's *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* subsumes ideological schemas that can be traced and analyzed via the linguistic structure of the text. The text is put under scrutiny through van Dijk's multiple ideology schematic structures. Results crop up to prove the validity of the ideological reading and the utility of the structures proposed.

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ايدولوجيا الآخر: دراسة ولاءات المجاميع و ايدولوجياتها

في أعمدة الحكمة السبعة

أ.د. مجيد حميد جاسم　　أ.م. جنان فضل الحجاج

مهما كان البناء الخيالي للأعمال الأدبية متقنا" و مهما حاول مبدعوها التزام الحياد، فلابد لها في نهاية

المطاف من ان تعكس الخلفية الايدولوجية و أنظمة الفكر الخاصة بهم في وقت كتابة النص. و إذا كان العمل

الأدبي قد كتب ليحمل شهادة عصر عرف بأحداث تغير كبيرة كما هو الحال مع **أعمدة الحكمة السبعة** لتي.

أي. لورنس ، فأن قراءة ذلك النص من منظور ايدولوجي تصبح ضرورة للوصول إلى فهم مكتمل و دقيق

للقوى التي عملت على تشكيله و فرضت البنية التي ظهر بها و لغرض تقيمه نقديا" و جماليا" و ايدولوجيا".

يشتمل نص **أعمدة الحكمة السبعة** على خطط ايدولوجية و التي يمكن تعقبها عبر البناء اللغوي في النص.

تبنت الدراسة الحالية تطبيق أنموذجا" لغويا" صاغه فان دايك (van Dijk) لغرض سبر أغوار النص

فكريا" و لقراءة مفرداته ايدولوجيا". جاءت النتائج لتبرز الايدولوجيات المختلفة في النص و التي يصل

الاختلاف بينها في بعض الأحيان إلى التضاد و حتى الصدام بين الأطراف المتعددة التي سلط النص الضوء

عليها من عرب و انجليز و أتراك.

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Introduction

In recent years and within the discipline of discourse analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) immensely flourishes. The major and most prosperous among its headings is the study of ideology and ideological systems. Terms such as racism, sexism, terrorism, ethnography, hegemony, and political ideology are all encompassed within the field leaving the door wide open before controversies, arguments, discord, opposition, division and even hostility. It is very clear that the world is organized around nodes of beliefs whether these beliefs are systematized in disciplines and corpus or intuitively comprehended and adhered to.

No system of belief whether formally recognized or not operates unless it has an ideology-oriented basis that implicates agreement and obedience on the one hand, disagreement and rebellion on the other. Thus, the simplest and most seemingly innocent of human beliefs hoard group ideologies and sets of thoughts and ideas whether they are expressed individually or collectively. The individual, i.e., the person does not uncover ideologies unless they are the manifestation of the ideological background s/he belongs to in terms of the social, political, religious, ethnic group s/he makes part of. In van Dijk's words, there is no personal ideology as it is inherently society-oriented in nature and destination. In the same vein, Antoniades (2003: 2-3) argues: "ideas do not exist without agents even though they are not reducible to them." This observation generally runs in agreement with Risse-Kappen's (in Antoniades, 2003: 2) assumption that "ideas do not float freely." So, there must be some potential carriers of these ideas; the individual can fairly well fit into that position though. Accordingly, there are social, political, religious, racist, feminist, and recently terrorist ideologies which all unfold in the practices, behaviours, plans, agendas, discourse/language of both the individual and the group.

In the current study, a book is put under the microscope in an attempt to elicit and assess the political, social, racial, and religious ideologies and to unveil the ideology struggle of the two distant groups that have to operate in unity out of sheer necessity and with inchoate reluctance on both sides. ***The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*** which is assumed documentary or at least based on factual events that took place before and during the preparations for the Arab Revolution in 1916 and after its success is indeed an arena for the ideological input represented by the Arabs, the English not to mention the Turks. It is indeed a document where the clash of interests of nations unfolds conspicuously. The present enterprise embarks on examining the ideological system that came to play whether consciously or furtively but still get exposed in the long run by picking the linguistic clues on the levels of syntax, semantics, lexicon, and rhetoric. The linguistic clues and choices are analyzed and assessed according to the strategies offered by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with a special adaptation of the insights of van Dijk's findings in the field. It rests on the assumption that the book as a discourse employs ideology-oriented methods and devices to strengthen/weaken/ cast doubts on/ exploit group solidarity, political schisms, religious concord, and cultural differences. Furthermore, there is the question of power and the distribution of power among conflicting groups which has to be addressed as well.

Ideology: An Overview

Van Dijk (2004a) explains that the term ideology was first coined by the French Philosopher Destutt de Tracy more than two centuries ago. Tracy (1754-1836) introduced the term to refer to nothing more than "a theory of ideas conceived within a sensorialist view of mind," in relation to the field of public education. Napoleon was the first to plant the term in the political realm when he accused Destutt de Tracy and his republican followers of ignoring "political reality for abstract ideas" (Koerner, 2004). Ever since its first introduction, the term has been often used and abused variously with such a wide array of disparity. The negative connotation of the term dates

back to Karl Marx "who followed upon Napoleon's negative slant using it thus in "The German Ideologies" to denote what he defined as "a false consciousness that is contradicted by the reality found in every day material life."

However, there came times in which the word is negatively defined as used in the media and social sciences. Ideology, thereupon, is associated notoriously with "the rigid, misguided or partisan ideas of others (Van Dijk, 2004a). As a result, one's group/political party has truths to propose/defend whereas the opponent's group has ideologies." Beaugrande (1999: 259), though admits that ideology is a deeply problematic term, still explains it as used in many registers and discourse as one that "routinely connotes some fixed, unreasoning dogma that foments conflicts as when Shils cited Fascism, Nazism, Bolshevism, and McCarthyism" as its illustrating examples. Geertz (in Beaugrande, 1999: 259) sheds the light on this conception:

> Like the politics it supports, it is dualistic, opposing the pure "we" to the evil "they", proclaiming that he who is not with me is against me. It is doctrinaire in that it claims complete and exclusive possession of political truth and abhors compromise. It is not totalistic in that it aims to order the whole of social and cultural life in the image of its ideals, futuristic in that it works toward a Utopian culmination of history in which such an ordering will be realized.

Fortunately, in the course of time, the term was neutralized and endowed with a more descriptive sense to denote political belief system (van Dijk, 2004a). Alternatively, ideology is sometimes defined in opposition "to other levels or subsystems, like economy or politics, and refers to a particular institutional space" (Schmid, 1981:57). Van Dijk (2004b:2) defines ideologies as belief systems that are socially shared by the members of groups or communities. Thus, it is made clear that private or personal ideologies do not exist since ideologies are a kind of social representation.

They are, van Dijk (2004c:17) maintains, "the basic frame works of organizing the social cognitions shared by members of social groups, organizations, or institutions." Unless, the ideas are shared by the group members, for instance, feminist/racist/anti-racist groups that have in common an ecological basis, the allegedly-called ideologies are no more than opinions. Group ideologies, nevertheless, are realized in individualistic practice. Montgomery and Allan (2004:3), notwithstanding, believe in the necessity of viewing the conception as a series of ideas that are separated from the material practice, an observation first made by the ideology pioneer Althusser.

Ideology: Connotations and Features

Van Dijk (1995: 17) assures that the concept of ideology operates within 'a conceptual triangle that connects the society, discourse and social cognition in the framework of a critical discourse analysis.' Ideologies, according to this triple conceptual perspective, are basic frameworks for organizing the social cognitions that are commonly shared by social groups, organizations, institutions. Consequently, ideologies have both the social and cognitive qualities. Social cognition is represented by 'the system of mental representations and processes of group members which interface with social position and interests of social groups '(van Dijk, 1995: 18). Further, ideology is triggered by sociocultural knowledge shared by the members of a specific group, community, or culture where the group members may also share evaluative beliefs, viz, opinions which are organized into social attitudes. Beaugrande (1999: 261) talks of the relation that ideology has with cultural concepts in terms of ideology and ecologism. Ideology, thus, can by no means, be separated from the way people act in real, culturally significant situations.

Van Dijk (2004b: 2) affirms the fundamental and axiomatic nature of ideologies, a matter that explains how they are gradually acquired or even changed through life and hence their relative stability. Their acquisition and emergence in the form of formulated systems are not sudden; their nature is

rather general and abstract. They define the identity of the group in terms of 'who we are' in relation to cultural values (freedom, equality, justice, etc,..) that are relevant to the group.

Relevant to the observation that groups have ideologies whereas individuals have opinions or rather attitudes is the argument that ideologies are not accounted for in terms of the emotional basis for they are sociocognitive concepts (Van Dijk, 2004a:5). As a result, when the ideologies of hate are examined, for instance, as in the case of racist or sexist ideologies, emotions are excluded in preference of shared negative evaluations where negative opinion, rather than hate, is highlighted. Emotions are stamped as highly 'temporal, contextual and personal, physiologically based, and cognitively interpreted events.' However, the fact that ideologies are not, by social definition, emotional does not prevent the individual group members from manipulating them emotionally in concrete situations.

Ideology has a lot to do with the notions of dominance and power as they, van Dijk (2004a:1) argues, 'play a role in the legitimization of power abuse by dominant groups.' One of the most efficient form of ideological dominance is observed when the dominated groups accept such form of ideological subservience in what is termed as hegemony or globalization, for instance. This ideological form leads to speak of ideology in terms of symbolic power or symbolic violence, which normally accompanies the practices of the dominant groups. Nevertheless, the dominated groups that are the subjects to which the power abuse and violence are directed may have their own ideologies, namely, of resistance and opposition. That is why, not only the ideologies of the dominant groups are taken into account, but those of the dominated as well. Ideologies are generally associated with social groups, classes, casts, or communities as they express their fundamental interests whether dominant or dominated. It is necessary to state that ideologies are basically foundational in that they, in essence, remain the same though their social representations that are based on them

(6)

may vary depending on other factors such as social practices, experiences, and so on (van Dijk, 2004b: 3). They may undergo modification, but less quickly and fundamentally than knowledge and attitudes that originally stem from them. Similarly, though ideologies are shared by the group members, there is nothing to guarantee that all the members know or comprehend the group ideologies equally. There are differences of 'expertise' in the group. There are however, experts, teachers, leaders and other ideologists 'who teach, explain, inculcate and explicitly reproduce the group ideologies' (van Dijk, 2004b: 4).To sum up, the meaning of ideology in discourse studies as framed by Van Dijk(2004a:2) is: 'the foundation of the social representations shared by a social group.' Depending on one's perspective, a group membership or ethics, these group ideas may be valued 'positively, 'negatively', or not to be valued at all.

Ideology and Language: Us versus Others

Since ideology is socially triggered and socially practiced by the members of specific group, the language that group adopts must expose their ideologies whether explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously. Simpson argues in favour of 'the conviction that language reproduces ideology,' stating:

> As an integrated form of social behaviour, language will be inevitably and inextricably tied up with the socio-political context in which it functions. Language is not used in a contextless vacuum; rather, it is used in a host of discourse contexts, contexts which are impregnated with the ideology of social systems and institutions. Because language operates within social dimension it must, of necessity reflect, and some would argue, construct ideology. (1993: 5)

The relationship between language and ideologies is summarized in Althusser's "obviousness" of language (Montgomery and Allan, 2004:3) where language "transparently" makes a word "name of a thing" or "have

meaning". Bakhtin and Volosinov assert that "every sign is subject to criteria of ideological evaluation." In consequence, it is proposed that " words, expressions, propositions, etc, change their meaning according to the [ideological] positions held by those who use them, which signifies that they find their meanings by reference to those positions; that is, by reference to ideological formations (Montgomery and Allan,2004:7). Sornig (1989: 95) rejects the possibility of the existence of 'a "pure", unbiased statement simply because ' the process of verbalizing thoughts and transmitting ideas involves the simultaneous signaling of purposes, aims and wishes along with the message itself.'

Pecheux refuses to posit that the meaning of a word exists in itself for human subjects to decode (Montgomery and Allan, 2004: 4). Besides, words cannot be analyzed without reference to how they operate within social parameters (of class, gender, race, etc,) which are themselves ideologically provoked. Thus, the assumption that insists on isolating the abstract linguistic system from social processes is altogether rejected. Any notion that dictates the existence of a fixed or stable meaning that is invariably attached to specific linguistic entities is similarly declined. Pecheux argues: "a word, expression or proposition does not have a meaning of its own, a meaning attached to its literality," for meaning is defined as "a word, expression or proposition for another word, another expression, or another proposition." In consequence, if the meaning of linguistic units is relative and dependent on some other factors that are at times non-linguistic, then the meaning of linguistic units can be bent or twisted to serve accomplishing ideological turns, among other things (Montgomery and Allan, 2004: 4).

Beaugrande (2004: 264) talks in terms of the existence of certain' preferences' of some grammatical options for appearing with certain others holding the 'grammar' together in what he calls 'colligability'. Similarly, there exist certain preferences of lexical options that appear with certain others and thus hold the 'lexicon' together, a condition termed as

'collocability.' Language, however, can invent grammatical colligations and lexical collocations for out-of-order aims, ideological among others. In the same vein, van Dijk (2004a:4) outlines coordination and cohesion in which ideological representations can be encoded. In the long run, there exist certain preferential discourse structures that can be utilized for the expression and communication of ideological contents (van Dijk, 2004c:22). These preferred or favoured structures loaded with the ideological purport operate within a sort of opposed representations that are articulated along an 'us versus them' equation. The afore mentioned opposed poles help the speakers or supporters of one group present themselves or their own group in positive terms and the other group(s) in negative terms. The opposed representation brings forward the concepts of 'we' and 'otherness' which are profoundly ideological (van Dijk, 2004c:22). It is assumed that the ideological discourse is generally organized by a general strategy of positive self-representation and negative other-presentation (derogation). That is why, ideological contexts may be sought for analysis rather than ideological texts. For the purpose of ideological analysis in question, Montgomery and Allan (2004:5) opt for a certain pair of categories, namely, linguistic basis and discursive process. The ideological representation is found to be the monopoly of the latter since discursive processes trigger the operation of certain compositional tendencies, such as the relative clauses, substitutions, synonymy, and paraphrase.

Surface structure signals of Ideology

Ideologies that are contextually inculcated in the text can be traced and picked on the level of surface structure of the discourse which employs "variable forms of expression at the level of phonological and graphical 'realization' of underlying syntactic, semantic, pragmatic or other abstract discourse structures" (van Dijk 2004c:23). Except for few of them, these surface structures of text and talk do not have explicit 'meanings' of their own, but are only ' the conventional manifestations of underlying meanings.' Still surface structures may be assigned to perform particular

operations from an ideological perspective. Thus, special stress structures of certain volume or a large printed type can be strategically utilized to convey emphasis, i.e., attract the attention to a certain meaning. Similarly, irony, sarcasm, impoliteness can be expressed accordingly. The emphasis and de-emphasis can be largely carried out by transitivity patterns. So, while the text meaning does not explicitly make clear these variations, surface structure may let transpire such hidden or covered implications.

Van Dijk (2004c: 24-31) sketches some about six types of surface structures that achieve ideological contents:

1. Syntax

Van Dijk (2004b:8) affirms that ideologies may influence all variable structures of discourse. However, the obligatory grammatical structures can not be ideologically marked because they are very much the same for all speakers of the language. Ideology can influence the syntactic structure of the sentences in relation to word order and transactional structures responsible for the notion of agency. In English, agency is determined by the grammatical subject and initial position. Ideologically speaking, opinions and attitudes of positive or negative nature can be attributed differently to different agents in different syntactic forms. Positive opinions are ascribed to the speaker's group where 'we' dominates the agent slot whereas negative opinions are specified to the opponent group with 'they' pronoun in the head. The speaker's group negative actions are similarly dimmed off by the use of the passive voice or by playing down the force of the syntactic structure by using agentless passives or nominalizations. Passive/active can be manipulated to focalize and defocalize certain bits of information. Furthermore, sentence complexity represents one link between syntactic structures and ideology since it has a lot to do with the education and social positions of the speakers: 'Elite speakers and institutions may restrict comprehensibility of their discourses in this way and, thereby, control access to public discourse, e.g. , to political and media text and talk.'

In consequence, the public might be excluded from elite debates and decision making (van Dijk, 2004b:25).

2. <u>Lexicon</u>

Words and the world are married.   (van Dijk, 2008:15)

Most words, van Dijk (2008:8) asserts, have no fixed meanings. Words are viewed as 'always connected to negotiable, changeable, and sometimes contested stories, histories, knowledge, beliefs, and values encapsulated into cultural models (theories) about the world' (van Dijk, 2008: 29). Hence, van Dijk (2004b: 8) holds the view that some linguistic variable structures are more ideologically sensitive than others. Meanings are more prone to ideological marking than syntactic structures because ideologies are essentially belief systems. Further,van Dijk (1995: 25) considers lexicalization as a major and well-known domain of ideological expression and persuasion, for instance, terrorists versus freedom fighters. In reference to the same persons, groups, social relations, or social issues, language users' choice of certain words is triggered by "the discourse genre, personal context (mood, opinion, perspective, social context,(formality, familiarity, group membership, dominance relations) and socio-cultural context (language variants, norms and values). "

Political ideologies are variably expressed in differential if not polarized lexicalization of political actors. The lexicon of military and political discourse may play on the 'peaceful' nature of *our* weapons in contrast to the 'catastrophic' and threatening nature of *theirs* (van Dijk, 1995: 26). Euphemism is employed crucially in the military and political propaganda and news reports. By analogy, and in relation to terrorism, the opponents are terrorists, whereas especially Muslims and not Christians in the Middle East are fundamentalists, zealots or fanatic. Euphemism is invested also in the elite discourse on ethnic and race relations where racism is denied and thus replaced by less harsh words such as 'xenophobia', 'prejudice', 'discrimination', or 'resentment' (van Dijk, 1995: 26).

Relevant to lexicalization and semantics is the issue of topicalization which could be liable to ideological twisting and management. In groups, speakers are expected to topicalize information that agrees with their interest or positive self-image. Alternatively, the same speakers are to topicalize information that emphasizes the negative properties of other/opponent's groups. Comparatively, detopicalization is expected of information that is inconsistent with one's group interest. Information that supports the positive self-image of our group suffers detopicalization (van Dijk, 1995: 26).   Polarization, euphemism, topicalization of favorite information, detopicalization of inconsistent information, etc, sum up the processes lexicon can achieve in service of the ideological frameworks.

3. Schematic structures

These structures are the domain of 'overall meaning' topics and macrostructures 'which can be organized by conventional schemata (upper structure)'. These schemata are used to define arguments, conversations, and news reports whose categories help decide the notion of importance and relevance (van Dijk, 1995: 28). Accordingly, initial summaries such as newspapers headlines can be responsible for singling out certain topics and dimming off others depending on the group positive or negative attitudes. They function crucially in the expression of the topic that is the highest/most prominent in the macrostructure hierarchy. Therefore, news reports semantically subordinated topics that organize local information can be made prominent by upgrading them through subsuming them in the headlines. Contrarily, a main and major topic can be downgraded by placing it in a lower level of schema category of the news. In a story, the same events may be presented as downgraded in the setting, or upgraded in the crucial complication of the story. In all the above cases, the in-group speakers assign the main topics and prominent positions to the group positive opinions and actions as well as the opponents' negative actions (van Dijk, 1995: 29)

4. Rhetoric

Rhetorical structures/devices and figures of speech that mark the surface structure can be ideologically employed. Rhyme, alliteration, metaphors, hyperbole (exaggeration), euphemism and mitigation, litotes and repetitions can add emphasis and prominence favouring certain ideological implications. Alternatively, demeaning metaphors can be manipulated to belittle, marginalize, and dehumanize the others. Political discourse is replete with variously demeaning metaphors that derogate the enemy (van Dijk, 1995: 30).

5.   Pragmatics

It is the domain of speech acts where 'social control of speech acts should operate through context models that represent the communicative situation and its participants' goals,' and other relevant 'appropriateness conditions.' Ideological beliefs of negative nature such as the inferiority of women/black people or inequality or other negative evaluations orient the production of speech. Command, threats, for instance, presuppose relations of dominance and power. Prejudices about the intellectual inferiority of others may result in the reliance on giving advices or even plain assertions as the recipients' ignorance is taken for granted (van Dijk, 1995: 30). Along with speech acts, international strategies of politeness, self-representation, and impression management are triggered by ideological bases. Impoliteness, rudeness, and lack of respect, for instance, mark the routine forms of every day verbal discrimination (van Dijk, 1995: 1).

6. Dialogical Interaction

In the domain of dialogue and conversation, speech acts and politeness play very paramount roles in the ideological representation. Positive self-representations and negative other-presentation require the use of certain speech act types and hence trigger the polite/impolite styles consecutively, for instance, in case of sexist talk with or about women or racist talk with or about minorities.

Power relations and power abuse are also defined ideologically in terms of interaction. Such ideological factors as 'setting agendas for meetings, making appointments, opening and closing dialogues, turn-taking management (e.g., interruption), the initiation, change, and closure of topics, style selection and variation, and more general properties of discourse' all orient power relation (van Dijk, 1995: 31).

The interactional nature of dialogue permits the ideologically power-based strategies to operate as the speakers who share 'egalitarian ideologies' may be apt to treat their speech partners as inferior. This is likely to occur when the norms of conversation are violated or flouted by interruption, refusing to yield or taking long turns, avoiding changing undesirable topics, negative meta-comments about the other's style (choice of words), or other attributed 'breaches' of etiquette, and the use of inegalitarian speech acts (van Dijk, 1995: 31).

It is worth mentioning that in addition to the verbal expression of ideological content, non-verbal forms of communication operate equally in the conveyance of ideological meanings. Hence, gestures, facial expressions, proximity, etc are ideologically employed.

7. Local Semantics

It is another domain of the lexical use that has a profound impact on the ideological expression. It is manifested in such elements as coherence, cause-result relations, implicitness/explicitness of expression, variant levels of generality and the degrees of specificity, denial, blame transfer, and the like, which are all at work within the ideological model (van Dijk, 2004b: 26-7).

The Seven Pillars of Wisdom: An ideological reading

If a book like *The Seven Pillars of wisdom* by T.E. Lawrence was written to comment on the events of a nation by a member of another and largely opposed nation whose interests may collide or converge with the former, then it must eventually team with opposed ideologies. This study endeavours to uncover and comment on some of the ideologies invested in

the text. As a testimonial documentary, *The Seven Pillars of wisdom* grows in time richer and vaster in ideological interpretations projected on its purport by the ensuing history-changing events in the region. Tabachnick (2012: 94) comments on the ongoing impact of Lawrence's 'Middle Eastern experience and the important lessons he derived from it,' which 'continue to reverberate because of our own ongoing and tangled experience with that part of the world.' Likewise, Murphy (2008: 88) speaks of the importance of the book as a reference up to the present time as the region rises as turbulent and agitated as ever. In addition, there is the question of hegemony: power, dominance, and power distribution among the ideologically disparate groups who had to coordinate their efforts and emerge as one power despite their diverse sets of goals and interests. The current analysis concentrates on Lawrence's contemplations in the Introduction and early chapters, basically one and two. Most of his speculations, analyses and evaluations of the events are spelt out there. The study does not refrain, however, from resorting to analyses from later chapters that elaborate on the summing commentaries of the opening chapters.

Arabs Versus Europeans: the Notion of the other

One of the most eminent elements of the text is the presence of the notion of the other. As the narrative commences, the line separating the two sides 'we' against 'the other' seems to be both thick and subtle. This is why, from the very beginning, Lawrence tried to formulate and pin down **the other** in a language conceivable to the Westerner. He attempted to force **the other** into the language faculty and into words, i.e., to *word-ize* **the other** following into the steps of 19th and early 20th centuries orientalists (and indeed he paraphrased and reworded what he had read about Arabs in the first chapters of the **Pillars**). To arrive at this effect, grammar is manipulated. Lawrence adopts a simple, direct language and expository, explanatory structures where static, descriptive, allegedly scientific statements are made. He poses the argument main thesis then proceeds to discuss it de facto proposing a direct topic for investigation in his

declaration that 'A first difficulty of the Arab movement was to say who the Arabs were,' (P.31).

The book opens with the separation of Arabs and the British intelligence bureau in Cairo, let alone Europe and England, looming up as a gigantic obstacle, which is what the opening topicalized statement states very clearly. Lawrence's job was to bridge the gap and make sure the cooperation is not only possible by efficient. The narrator explains in an alienated and distant tone in which he tried to capture his early detachment prior to the change he was to undergo later. However, there is much more than the tone of detachment and indifference characteristic of the offhand account suggests. One can not ignore the too obvious fact that the statement is contrived to look objective and scientific not to mention innocent. The pseudo-cleft structure is a case in point where the agent, the linchpin and originator of the notion is absent altogether. The source that launches the polemical comment is disguised. Who thought that the Arabs were difficult to define? Were they the sources Lawrence was avidly perusing these years in his Cairo office? Was it the intelligence department or Lawrence himself trying to pin down the Arabs as a notion into stable, fixed patterns of expression? Grammar here is crucial if one is to make head from tail of such obscure statement for the pseudo-cleft structure diverts the attention from queries concerning the identity of the authority quoted to the purport of the message itself: Arabs are a difficult affair. Further, the choice of the word **difficulty** as head is also by no means random. Discussing the Arab issue with his co-workers and superiors, Lawrence was aware of the problematic nature of summoning an army from the mythically so-called Arabs. In his opinion and later arguments, he makes clear point-blank that Arabs do not exist. So, the Arab movement, if any, was to be created from scratch, should be manufactured somewhere, in the Cairo bureau for instance, and then exported to Arabia. The raw materials were there and all they need was a good recipe, a careful mixture, and of course a brilliant head to lead. However, the concoction is a very strenuous and arduous task,

too heavy perhaps to be shouldered up single-handed, a fact that impinged on Lawrence's consciousness and called for a different strategy.

To define who the Arabs were which is a question Lawrence embarks on to inaugurate his tale, he would later opt for anthropological and linguistic criteria. He presumes that the language is responsible for the name which *we* at the bureau called it Semitic. This vein of debate brings him to what he knows best from shelves of books written over history on the topic: Arabs are Semites, in conclusion. Again, he avoids specifying the people he tries to analyze and resorts to supposedly innocent, objective scholastic commentary. Just like any typical Westerner, he analyzes the Arab mentality in a frozen perspective:

> Semites had no half-tones in their register of vision. They were a people of primary colours, or rather of black and white, who saw the world always in contour… they knew only truth and untruth, belief and disbelief without our hesitating retinue of finer shades.   P.36

He strikes a comparison between his **kind** on the one hand identified by the collective pronoun **our** and the Semites on the other. In consequence, he points to what he perceives of as the inability of the latter to keep a middle course as they have no appreciation for the European adage of the golden middle. Alternatively, Semites are extremists and fanatics since they miss the many gray areas in between the black and white of the world's spectrum. The colour and vision-metaphors fit beautifully into his paradigm. The Semite vision, he suggests, is malformed and thus unable to detect fine shades. The whole comment relies on the optical metaphor of a many colour prism where the Europeans are alert to the slightest and subtlest change of shade. The Arab vision is impaired, perhaps beyond repair, in a way that assists categorizing them as narrow-minded as he later bluntly proclaims expounding his first evaluations: 'they were a limited, narrow-minded people, whose inert intellects lay fallow in incurious resignation' (P.36).

There is of course the distant and latent implication that they are not experts at manipulation and deceit or are even ignorant of their ever being existent. Despite the sweet coating, the core beneath remains as bitter as calling Arabs primitive. The European race, in contrast, is aware of the finer shades, a knowledge that imposes uncertainty and skepticism among its demerits or merits perhaps. The choice of the tense is rather peculiar as it places the notion in a time frame deep in the past. These are Lawrence's primary attitudes derived from the general panoramic view. These statements are part of the European heritage shared by all its peoples. He was then, in the past depicted in the quotes above, armed by nothing better than book knowledge and second-hand tales. His later position would undergo drastic transformation. In his Arab garments though farcical as they were, Lawrence embarked on a journey not only into the depth of the desert but Arab mentality as well. But this, of course, had to wait. Now, he continues to assume on behalf of the other:

> The common base of all the Semitic creeds, winners or losers, was the ever present idea of world-worthlessness. Their profound reaction from matter led them to preach bareness, renunciation, poverty; and the atmosphere of this invention stifled the minds of the desert pitilessly.   P. 38

Despite the sweeping generalization where all Semites are described as austere and unworldly, a statement that turns false once tested, the choice of vocabulary is peculiar. Winners or losers, Semites are abjectly poor and their surroundings are as bare as the vast desert engulfing them. Nevertheless, neither austerity nor poverty or bareness is a disgrace especially when they culminate in infallible spirituality. The fact that their minds are *stifled* by the above conditions is though. An Arab would feel flattered once described as renouncing worldly quests seeking higher and more sublime even divine pursuits. The religious faith pours into that same vein nourishing the sense of the triviality of worldly aspirations. This fact seems on the back of Lawrence's mind, hence the choice of the verb 'preach'. What attracts the attention is why eulogy is twisted to serve

criticism. Here, local semantic works where the blame of Arab narrow-mindedness falls on the Semitic creed and the desert bareness; the alleged narrow-mindedness is never suspect to be effected by the deficient European perspective. Arabs are thus narrow-minded but there are reasons that Lawrence came to uncover as he lived in the desert. There is also the undercurrent that the above explicated quality would never be annihilated for it is 'ever present'. The Arabs can never extricate their mental view of 'world-worthlessness' and of course 'the narrow-mindedness' it reproduces. These people are brainwashed by a sham notion of the world worthlessness that cuts every mundane pursuit of theirs short before its accomplishment. This observation assisted Lawrence formulating a Jihad war against Turkey with Hashemites as leaders. In all, the above comment makes a change or a slight modification of the inherited ideologies concerning Semites where Lawrence found excuses, perhaps even pretexts for the general lethargy with which Arabia in his opinion was plagued.

Further, one can observe the way the choice of vocabulary works and particularly the winners/losers contrast is employed. The overtone is that all Semites – here of course Arabs– hold on to that view, i.e., world worthlessness. But the undertone is that of a contest or competition whose final result means nothing in European calculations. Whether this project would pay off or backfire has nothing to contribute to the Arab creed. The contrast also sums up history for the Arabs maintained that same creed for centuries.

Lawrence in the Arab world

It is very clear that Lawrence is a delegate with an agenda and at his disposal certain privileges that help him carry out his mission successfully, a fact neither *The Pillars* nor Lawrence's later statements deny it. The opening chapter teams with revelations, political schemes and maneuvers to outsmart the Arabs by using all that he learnt about the Arab history over the years he worked in Cairo.

> I was sent to these Arabs as a stranger, unable to think their thoughts or subscribe their beliefs, but charged by duty to lead them forward and to develop to the highest the movement of theirs profitable to England in her war. Today in my old garments, I could play the bystander, obedient to the sensibilities of our theatre. P.28

In the above commentary, grammar is again resorted to so as to camouflage and dim off the agent. The passive voice keeps in the shadow the British authorities that commissioned Lawrence and other officers to Arabia. The structure through negation and contrast conveys what he intended his sentence to mean. The present moment after the revolution paid off, or not all the same, is focalized compared to the time prior to its beginning when he was first sent to Arabia. The radical change or rather the transformation he underwent, drastic as it is, is placed in the light and eventually in contrast with the detachment and indifference of the stranger whose primary mission had been patriotic and oriented towards the full service of his country heedless of what the Arabs really aspired to. He implied that he did his job perfectly well in regard of the British schemes though it does not mean that he was not morally touched. That it was a farce is a fact that did not escape his shrewd observation, hence the ensuing theatre-metaphor. Now as an on-looker not a major performer in the show, he can assess articulately the situation and take to task the farcical elements it involved with a tinge of mitigated self-criticism; self-blame is not due yet.

Similarly, when delinquency is detected on the part of the British commissioners, Lawrence prefers to employ the passive structures where the predicament is focalized and the hands behind it are blacked out: 'No money was sent up at all' (P.95). The British pledged their word to aid the Arab revolt with money, weapons and other logistic matters, but few of these promises were kept. Notwithstanding the hindrances and the broken promises, the revolutionists carried on all the same: 'In Cairo the yet-hot authorities promised gold, rifles, mules, more machine-guns, and mountain

guns; but these last, of course, we never got'   (P.171). Lawrence resorts to his same strategy: glossing over the people behind delinquency and inefficiency. Incompetent British figures whether political or military are detopicalized either by passive structures or generalization as 'yet-hot authorities'. It is astonishing how the British authorities with their stereotypical ideas concerning the Arabs could account for the continuity of the warfare at the Arabian front without payment. Lawrence ironically reminisces about how the west derides the oriental fiscal mentality with the pronoun '**our**' carrying a rather sarcastic tone:

> It was *our* habit to sneer at Oriental soldiers' love of pay; but the Hejaz campaign was a good example of the limitations of that argument.   P.105

Still, Lawrence does not lay the blame on his own side of the bargain. Orientals, he explains, are not restrictively Arabian but include Indians for instance with whom Britain has vast experience. Further, the Hejaz Prince Feisal himself was skeptic and pessimistic about the potential of success of a bankrupt campaign. The incident, to be recounted, provides some support to his earlier arguments and may be looked at as a proof of the at least partial validity of the European sweeping generalization concerning the oriental people's love of money. Feisal's men fought when no money arrived at all and when there was no prospect of real profit. They continued much to Lawrence's astonishment and Feisal's baffled fear of possible reluctance. Hence, the latter perhaps infected with some of former's doubts would take precautionary extra measures; therefore, both were caught in an awkward, contradictory fallacy:

> No money was sent up at all: to take its place Feisal filled a decent chest with stones, had it locked and corded carefully, guarded on each daily march by his own slaves, and introduced meticulously into his tent each night. By such theatricals the brothers tried to hold a melting force.   P. 95

These Bedouins astonished not only the skeptical British but their Arab leader as well. The farcical chest of gold is a very old trick, which could have been a fiasco if one soldier demanded his pay on the spot. No one did, not because they swallowed the bait; plausibly they willingly did. Around tent fires, Bedouin storytellers must have told about tricks of this kind as they narrated legendary adventures and Arabian tales of courage and danger. The story, however, is quoted with Feisal as the greater culprit to take the edge off Lawrence's generalization and baseless creeds concerning Arabs, Orientals and Semites. Since, If Feisal, the Arab Emir, entertained doubts and acted accordingly, how about then a foreigner like Lawrence? He was then fully entitled to. Lawrence's tone suggests that what he believed was not far from the truth; again his judgment was outweighed by cultural stereotypes about the other.

Arabizing Lawrence: a Disguise

As the saga continued, Lawrence grew more aware on a daily basis of his awkward position to fit into Arabia. Primarily, he ignored and perhaps overlooked the importance of the external appearance. Of course, when he first started, he did not think that his plans would carry him that far. But as time went by and necessity arose, it would have become urgent to address the issue whether Feisal probed it or not. Wearing Arab robes would accomplish the job of the surface acclimatization successfully:

> *Suddenly* Feisal asked me if I would wear Arab clothes like his own while in the camp. I should find it better for my own part, since it was *a comfortable dress* in which to live Arab-fashion as we *must do*. Besides, the tribesmen would then understand how to take me. The only wearers of khaki in their experience had been Turkish officers, before whom they took up an *instinctive defence. If I wore* Meccan clothes, they would behave to me *as though* I were really one of the leaders; and I *might slip* in and out of Feisal's tent without making a sensation which he had to explain away each time to strangers. I agreed at once, very

gladly; for army uniform was *abominable when camel-riding* or when *sitting about on the ground*; and the *Arab things*, which I had learned to manage before the war, *were cleaner and more decent in the desert*. (Emphasis added) P. 129

An examination of the linguistic input of the above quote shows the way language especially grammar and pragmatics are put to full use. The discussion starts with such an adverb as **suddenly** insinuating that Lawrence was oblivious of the matter and that the idea came impromptu. It came out of the blue lacking any prior determinate planning and so clearing him, to the Western observer, of complicity. It suggests obliquely a further evidence of Feisal's shrewdness and insight and in the long run Lawrence's, for he was the man that Lawrence admired and relied upon to see his scheme through eliminating his three brothers. Simultaneously, it suggests how far he was successful in grafting and inoculating himself in the desert milieu winning fully to his side the Sherifan Emir. Now, one may consider the pragmatic level of the message taking into consideration the speech acts employed. One can not fail to notice that he adopts indirect speech to encode the dialogue going on between Feisal and himself on that occasion omitting on purpose his own reply to the suggestion and sufficing with listing the merits of the Arab dress from a sheer practical perspective. However, the indirect speech revolving around the pronoun **I** blurs the boundaries between the addresser and addressee. Feisal's and Lawrence's exchanges merge to emerge as one voice talking both into a welcome reception of the change. The speaker that argues about the importance of the Arab dress was of course Feisal. In such an instance, the gap between **I/we** and **the other** is not bridged, but only overlooked for practical reasons.

The whole speech is made up of an introductory thesis in the conditional if-structure 'If I would wear Arab clothes' and a series of reasons to justify and lend force to the argument as diagram (1) below makes clear. Lawrence had in mind his patriotic English readers whose cultural/ideological background and superiority notions would lead most of them, at least, to be repulsive to and eventually rebellious against the

gesture. A more partial look at the choice of adjectives reveals much more besides. Again, Lawrence did not want to be too assuming. Those were not times to show off the pride in the vernacular. Rejecting the seemingly generous offer could by no means be the very mistake that would send the whole plan toppling, but would have complicated and prolonged his efforts to bond with the strangers and particularly the skeptical among them. The malicious could not be brought around neither by dress change nor any other strategy though. They could see his real agenda, not to mention, disapprovingly.

Diagram (1): Feisal and Lawrence's Dialogical structure

Thesis : Question (suggestion)	Feisal asked me if I would wear Arab clothes
Supporting Argument : Reason 1	it was *a comfortable dress*
Reason 2	the tribesmen would then understand how to take me.
Elaborate Explanation	The only wearers of khaki in their experience had been Turkish officers, before whom they took up an *instinctive defence*. *If I wore* Meccan clothes, they would behave to me *as though* I were really one of the leaders; and I *might slip* in and out of Feisal's tent without making a sensation which he had to explain away each time to strangers.
Answer: Agreement	I agreed at once, very gladly
Supporting Argument: Reason 3	army uniform was *abominable when camel-riding* or when *sitting about on the ground*;
Reason 4	the *Arab things*, *were cleaner and more decent in the desert*.

Two more conditional structures ensue with another **if** and an **as though**; still the tone is rather apologetic despite his assurance of pleasure to do off khaki. Praising the practicality, cleanliness, and comfort of 'the Arab things' carried a dormant sense of embarrassment though, hence the use of the word 'things', which indicates the vagueness and clumsiness of the situation. The clothes change meant stepping off his native garments into a foreign one, which happened to be looked down upon and perhaps even ridiculed back home. It was a must not a point of choice, he seems to imply. It was resorted to out of sheer necessity not a luxurious turn. Humble as it was and shrouded perhaps with guilt, the wardrobe change is a point where there was a considerable tearing away from the old customs. Also, it meant, on the other hand, disguise, a sort of a chameleon-colour change. It was a successful attempt at masquerade; the theatrical metaphor is always on the back of Lawrence's mind. Now with the right costumes and the right justifications appending, the performance could proceed more comfortably.

However, what started as an affectation ended up in a surrealistic empathy. Lawrence was going to show up in Sherifan officer uniform at the Allies Peace Conference in London in 1919 and would pose before celebrated artists for portraits, and an effigy of him in the Arab robes would be later made in his memory (Murphy, 2008: 88). Then, the breaking from the old position was complete and irretrievable. The transformation was the least external for deep down all the old doctrines were shattered to pieces. This transformation did not happen overnight though. It was gradual and strenuous for the emotions it regenerated later on were far from comfortable. While fighting, Lawrence was in no way inclined to dwell on the ethical side of his mission. There were flashing moments of realization, but these were very quickly repressed. He had the British agenda to take care of, not to mention his own ambitions. Then, time was not up to address personal reservations on the ground of honour or integrity. The moral struggle was to surface later when the campaign succeeded but higher endeavours aborted. Fallen between two stools, Lawrence analyzes his awkward predicament where dress does not simply designate the external

disguise, but metaphorically indicates all Lawrence's efforts to pass as an Arab. He aimed as high as capturing mentality through the sham imitation of dress and conquering the racial and cultural barrier:

> In my case, the effort for these years to live in the dress of Arabs, and to *imitate* their *mental foundation*, *quitted* me of my English self, and let me look at the *West* and its conventions *with new eyes*: they destroyed it all for me. At the same time I could not sincerely take on *the Arab skin*: it was an *affectation* only.
>
> (P. 30)   (Italics added)

Lawrence realizes that voicing such a statement would be perplexing to the Western mind after centuries of a thriving colonialism. Hence, his tone is explicitly defensive. Lawrence was definitely reputed for his bold proclamations especially after the war ended. Still, if he claimed as much as that he now saw in a half-Arab, half-European eyes or even neither, his Western admirers would be shocked. As a compromise, he talked about how living with the Arabs destroyed his Western vision for him leaving him in a limbo of fuzzy feelings.

Earlier, he talked of the genuine imitation whose purpose is to pass in the guise of the imitated as successfully as possible using an interesting Yahoo-metaphor: 'A man who gives himself to be a possession of aliens leads a Yahoo life, having bartered his soul to a brute-master. He is not of them' (P. 29). The commentary is assumed to work objectively where Lawrence tries to generalize and contemplate as an outsider assessing the experience of that 'he' who forces himself to adopt a disguise. The undertone is depreciatory in regard to he who presumes the mask. That he was very adroit in carrying out the business– though he admits the assiduity involved– is also hardly self-complimentary. The *Yahoo* reference takes the reader to Swift's **Gulliver's Travels** when Gulliver lands with the Yahoos, an exotic race. Gulliver changes views and develops respect and reverence to the Yahoos whom he first loathed and was repelled by due to stereotypical notions of inherent superiority and prestige of his own kind.

The transformation in the tale goes so deep as assure that the traveller later finds it difficult to live with his own type on his return home. The metamorphosis is final and irreversible though regret seems to be out of the question. Would Gulliver have been content if he did not attain knowledge? Or would he have been pleased with himself deprived of this precious awareness? Lawrence probably grappled with similar questions.

Judging **the other** on grounds as precarious and flimsy as promulgated beliefs that stem from cultural misconceptions formulated afar or from distant visits or even heresy is myopic and must be condemned in the long run. First-hand knowledge of the other is preached, not only to bring people together but also to assert the true and legitimate existence, if any, of the presumed superiority. Whether he liked it or not, admitted or passionately denied it, the pretension took over and dominated one way or another. Lawrence's later life events and choices prove that he had not come to peace with himself. He seemed to have never reconciled with the world, hence the name change to Ross and later Shaw – obviously under the influence of George Bernard Shaw, the famous cynical, Irish dramatist. Struggling with depression on the one hand and with self-discontentment and even self-blame on the other, he could not arrive at a compromise.

There is also the keen innuendo, impractical and idealistic though, that what sets the world apart is a superficial barrier that is skin deep only. The expression may be felt contradictory with the previous arguments. Lawrence complains about how his worldview suffered such profound transformation that he is no longer able to maintain his original stands, not only concerning the Arab but European world as well. Thereupon, between him being quitted of his English self and the admission that the Arab years were merely affectation, the controversy remains unresolved.

Transformation: Confession of Duplicity

The stranger, however, managed to infiltrate into the Arabian milieu and invoke its idealistic dreams of warfare and adventure. He was well-versed

and prepared for what he should do to penetrate a world that remained fortified and immune despite dissidence and invasions. But the influence was by all means mutual for the disguiser did not quit the Arabian arena intact. In fact, it was rather improbable for while he thought he was bending the Arab will into his patriotic service breaking the people into malleability, his will was broken too. It dawned upon him later but realization could not undo what was already irretrievably done. So, there remains nothing except the humble confession of the truth. He assumes to have metamorphosed in the process so he no longer fitted into his old garments and a new entity emerged neither British nor Arab. But while the preparation moved fast and with vehemence towards the revolution, the stranger grouped himself with neither xenophobia nor prejudice with these people:

> *Some of the evil* of my tale may have been inherent in our
> circumstances. For years, *we* lived anyhow with one another
> in the naked desert, under indifferent heaven. P. 27

This is how Chapter I commences the narration with a resounding commentary tone, which exempts the evil acts that came along with the tricky affairs of the movement. It is the evaluation spelt out at leisure after all the crooked affairs of the revolution were wrapped up neatly. Lawrence assesses the situation in a rather collective awareness discarding the singular, monolithic attitudes of the earlier speculations. He is neither in the centre nor the sole voice in the march. With the pronoun '**we**' endorsing the experience narrated, Lawrence does not tear himself away from the revolution rank and file. What gathered the diverse multitudes of English, French and Arabs, is the code of the war and affinity of the desert, but on top urgent necessity. Under the desert impartial sky, all merge into a single volition to carry out what they planned, dreamed of and entertained doubts about its verity. It was a figment of the imagination of the leaders whose contagious spirit infected all the ranks in the course of time so as to emerge as the ultimate challenge of the former and the dream of the latter. In defiance of every obstacle and any distinction, they forgot or overlooked the rest.

> As *time* went by, *our* need to fight increased to an unquestioning possession, riding with spur and rein over *our doubts. Willy-nilly it became a faith.* We had sold ourselves to its *slavery*, *manacled* ourselves together in its chain gang, *bowed* ourselves to serve its holiness with all our good and ill content. (P. 27)

Fellowship of arms is often overestimated and the ***Pillars*** is no exception. The so-called camaraderie that the encounter with death secretes is the glue that binds strangers whose fate lies in the hands of each other and in some code of honour and loyalty. Besides, it was unlikely that these people had any choices to make other than watch each other's back. The dream of freedom and of the possibility of making difference added further edge to the compact of the war and whetted the imagination of its participants. In the-for-them noble pursuit, fighters fell prey to another, just as merciless slavery, hence the use of the slavery metaphor. Introducing his tale and in his apologetic or at best defensive undertone, Lawrence resorted to romanticize the bond growing between him and the fighters. Attributing the credit to time in the first place, he insists that the men, him included with the endorsing possessive **our**, were incised by the dream of liberty but in the end became slaves of that dream. It was a question of exchange. They traded one ruthless master with another just as merciless. They bartered their care-free but marginal existence with one that was arduous and precarious but promised legendary glories and riches. They saw the death of their own comrades, brothers, and kinsmen, but all the same they kept going unflinchingly. There was no other option open for negotiation. They started this awkward business and they had to put some decent end to it once and for all. They grew tough and cruel in the service of the sublime conquest.

In that same spirit of camaraderie, killing was part and parcel of the bargain binding the involvers even further. In spite of the desert feuds and tribal forays, blood was not spilled casually: 'Blood was always on our hands: we are licensed to it' (P. 29). They shared the atrocities of the war and took part in its overwhelming cruelty. Lawrence assumed a lot on

behalf of his Arab brothers in arms to the extent that he could contradict an Arab prince using the collective **we** in a rather peculiar way. *We Arabs* as used by Lawrence and if sincere seemed a point of complete departure and absolute uprooting from his native background. Or else it could the best simulation ever contrived. He was either a diabolical liar or an idyllic dreamer or perhaps a combination of both:

> Abdulla was troubled to understand why the British shot their abandoned beasts. I pointed out how *we Arabs* shot one another if badly wounded in battle; but Abdulla retorted it was to save us from being so tortured that we might do ourselves shame.   (Italics added) (P. 588)

Here can be noticed the manipulation of lexicon in a way that accelerates a change in favour of the user. While Abdulla foments against the British tradition, Lawrence defends it maintaining his distance. By assuming self-detachment, he provides a counter example that cogently puts the attempted criticism to rout. Through allegedly and probably farcically allying himself with Arabs, he affirms the spotless, flawless or at least the practical nature of British practices; and in short the patriot pares his disguise. Abdulla's exclamation is far more idealistic than even Lawrence expected it to be.

The ambition and yearning to accomplish it were the forces that accelerated the infusion of the Englishman into the body of Arabia despite reluctance. As time went by, the sham act took on the veneer of reality so that drawing clear –cut lines was difficult for him. Hence, the notion of madness is first introduced as a pretext to ironically account for the way the opposed poles welded. It is madness that propels the whole issue and no room was reserved for a shred of sanity. The whole project was a mad idea accomplished by mad men. This seemed to him a very feasible explanation to lull his otherwise revolting senses against the insanity and deceit. There is however, the awareness that he fell under two opposed influences. The reference in the end to the persistence presence of '*two customs, two educations, two environments*' treats the two poles rather equally:

> Sometimes these selves would converse in the void; and then madness was very near, as I believe it would be near the man who could see things through the veils at once of *two customs, two educations, two environments*.   (P. 30)

Self-realization could not be fended off long, but then and at that point he could not afford full awareness. It was a luxury not to get caught by guilt or remorse; still to have a clear conscience is out of the question for he had his hands deep not only in blood but also treachery, betrayal and deception:

> For my work on the Arab front *I had determined* to accept nothing. The Cabinet raised the Arabs to fight for us by definite promises of self-government afterwards. Arabs believe in persons, not in institutions. They saw in me a free agent of the British Government, and demanded from me an endorsement of its written promises. So I had to join the conspiracy, and, for what my word was worth, assured the men of their reward. (P.23-24)

Looking back at the past– hence his use of the past perfect *I had determined* to encode an analepsis, Lawrence resumes the self-oriented perspective where he extricated himself from being part of the blind selfish side of the British political scheme. He considers it a point of honour to proclaim that he had no share in the spoils accepting 'nothing' in return of his efforts and risks during the years of the revolt. He was no mercenary on pay. Nevertheless, he could not wholly exempt himself from indulging the British promises since Arabs believed in him and his person rather than the British abstractions. He lays the blame on the Cabinet, another indefinite entity rather than name the people responsible. One way or another, he was a complicit. He was one of these people who pledged their word for convenience to see the plan through. Nor was he by any means ignorant to the precarious and incredible status of these promises. The general agency of the Cabinet and The British government camouflages the real decision makers but does not get Lawrence off the hook. Besides, self-realization

overrules ultimately. It is more comforting to confess the truth no matter how unbecoming and mortifying. The Arabs were not so naïve as to embrace the plan without written assurances if not for Lawrence's intervention. The mention of the written promises plumbs deep the Arab predicament and insinuates at written promises endorsed by Britain in relation to people other than Arabs as exemplified in Belfour's document. In the case of the latter, Britain did not have other powerful partners to consult with unlike the case of Arab independence and rule:

> Rumours of the fraud reached Arab ears, from Turkey. *In the East persons* were more trusted than institutions. So the Arabs, having tested my friendliness and sincerity under fire, asked me, as a free agent, to endorse the promises of the British Government. I had had no previous or inner knowledge of the McMahon pledges and the Sykes-Picot treaty, which were both framed by war-time branches of the Foreign Office. But, not being a perfect fool, I could see that if we won the war the promises to the Arabs were dead paper. *Had I been an honourable adviser I would have sent my men home, and not let them risk their lives for such stuff.* Yet the Arab inspiration was our main tool in winning the Eastern war. (p. 282-3)

This is another piece of cultural plus psychological penetration of the Arab persona and more generally Eastern logic which values people as individuals whose word once pledged in sincerity could oblige the whole tribe to obedience. The code of the desert life dictated such a custom and Lawrence was fully aware of and made the best use of it. Notwithstanding, he preferred to assign it to the black and white Eastern mental framework that fails to recognize fine colours in between as he earlier explicated point blank! Syntactical structures are again used to help promote his argument. The conditional structure towards the end – Had I been- carries self-blame but really no regret. Otherwise, he would have selected a different structure such as 'I should have….' In the end, he was a government agent and mobilizing Arabia was urgent for the success of their –our– plans.   The

apologetic tone forces Lawrence to do off the Arab disguise and identify himself as British with the collective pronouns **we** and **our** on the one hand and Arab on the other to trigger the split. More importantly is that he seems to carry the load of dishonour and fraud all by himself. It is very hard to explain such logic that tends to be sparing of the British officials. Probably, his attitude is that while the government had its excuses for deceiving Arabs, he had none at all. He had to act his part in the conspiracy, which he espoused and nourished with his personal promises credible to the Arab mind. They believed him and never hesitated when he undertook a mission for 'Aurans' was the 'harbinger of action' (P. 413). Early in the narrative, he makes use of the conditional structures to sort of extricate himself of culpability which he is going later to recapitulate more or less along the text:

> It was evident from the beginning that if we won the war these promises would be dead paper, *and had I been an honest adviser of the* Arabs I would have advised them to go home and not risk their lives fighting for such stuff: but I salved myself with the hope that, by leading these Arabs madly in the final victory I would establish them, with arms in their hands, in a position so assured (if not dominant) that expediency would counsel to the Great Powers a fair settlement of their claims. (P.24)

The tone of confession is resumed more powerfully with a clear ring of impeachment. The speaker does not refrain from unwrapping his dishonesty towards the Arabs. Through the hypothetical perspective conveyed by the conditional clause, he self-criticizes his double-dealing and duplicity. He did not deny that he double-crossed those who had faith in him. At the same time, he hinted at powers that are beyond him and he had no control over so his statement indicates a blame-transfer, which is one of the domains of local semantics. Moments of remorse, which were anyhow sparse and brief, are outlived by false hopes on groundless convictions. It was convenient to pretend and lie while the war was going on for once it was waged, there was no going back. Once the war was over, falsehood is no longer glossed

over or denied. There were powers stronger and more impervious than Lawrence and his lot (we) who ran the show, Lawrence's argument suggests. They were the real puppeteers and all the strings were tightly held by them. The Arab fate was in the hands of these Great powers whose own interests, as all were aware Lawrence and Arabs, constantly gained the upper hand. Not even Britain alone could say the final word about the region or in relation to such 'claims' as Arab rule and independence. As the notion of power is introduced, there is of course the implication that the power balance, which was highly needed then to lay hold of the claims, was lacking. Further, the presence of powers on the one hand normally implies the absence of power on the other. While the British and the West had power to invest and impose compromises on others, Arabs were the weaker link in the puzzle. Thereupon, it was a case of hegemony. The only ground against which the false hope rested was an idyllic, wishful thinking that these powers had an inkling of integrity, if any, towards a cause that is basically irrelevant to theirs. Years later and after things settled down, Lawrence, in Murphy's words (2008: 87) 'could not convert his popular image into political pressure and he ultimately resigned from all offices and, it could be argued, turned his back on the world that he had known.'

Lawrence could not dodge the responsibility or pass it to others though. Every time the British plan proved foolhardy, he had to act quickly in support of the treachery. Towards the end of his tale, Lawrence makes such controversial proclamations as compellation and absence of choice, which can be analyzed as a disguised blame-transfer:

> There was no escape for me. *I must take up again my mantle of fraud in the East*. With my certain contempt for half-measures I took it up quickly and wrapped myself in it completely. It might be fraud or it might be farce*: no one should say that I could not play it.* (P. 515).

Again, here, the Western perspective gets in the way for while he was deemed the loyalist agent of the government, he was a farcical actor in the East with his perfect costume of fraudulence, hence the *mantle* metaphor. That he disdained 'half-measures' was a perfect excuse for rejecting half-convictions. Like the perfectionist he was, he must excel at the task he embarked on, i.e., deception. Once more, he fished for a feasible pretext to pass. It was the sheer necessity and no one should contemplate the probability of rejecting it or worse holding him guilty of its consequences. He performed his part in the farce and he did so extravagantly well. At the time, he would have allowed no skepticism. The overruling tone is that of shameless confession where urgency demands people who are otherwise meticulously good to take drastic and equally immoral measures. That the end justifies the means seemed to be on the back of his then practical mind.

Nevertheless, he formulates his argument on a more candid ground and with less appeasement and self-contentment. Though he is keen to affirm that he was not the master mind of the deceit, still he admits that he 'must have had some tendency, some aptitude, for deceit, or I would not have deceived men so well, and persisted two years in bringing to success a deceit which others had framed and set afoot.' Though he remarks that he could not set a date on which his transformation had started and his 'guilt passed from accessory to principal,' it has, once realized, caused him bitterness and embarrassment. Further, he had 'bitterly repented' his 'entanglement in the movement.' The moral objection, which was 'sufficient to corrode' his 'inactive hours,' was not enough though to make him 'cut' himself 'clear of it.' In short, his will must have oscillated between the urge to see the endeavour accomplished and 'vapid complainings' (P. 569). The lexical items were chosen in a way that gives the reader a glimpse of the demons at war within, but also to ensure that he was not completely heedless to his moral dilemma. Perhaps, he had in mind a time where his motives would be bitterly questioned and hence prepared an analysis that would do him some credit.

Final Resolution: Shame and Contempt

> In our two years' partnership under fire they grew accustomed to believing me and to think my Government, like myself, sincere. In this hope they performed some fine things, but, of course, instead of being proud of what we did together, I was bitterly ashamed. (P. 24)

When change is inaugurated especially if radical, drastic and painful, it does not happen overnight. Lawrence did not question the legitimacy of his country claims except towards the end of the whole quest. When it was becoming very clear that the once sounding foolish plan bore more fruits than predicted. In his very simple, direct phraseology, two years of fighting in the desert, ambushing, murdering the Turks and seeing how the Arabs were being hoodwinked were what he needed to feel disillusioned with the government whose guarantees he chose to believe in against his better judgment. Lawrence brings his reader back to the notion of camaraderie whose dictates are not necessarily verifiable. Only this time he relinquishes the impeaching tone he adopted earlier in preference of a less self-deprecatory one where some notion of sincerity takes over. The notion of hope is also resumed in an attempt at self-mitigation if any. The expression seems to, though reluctantly, suggest that Arabs were double-crossed indeed by the false – or should it be, broken promises of the government; Lawrence was, likewise, deceived! For a second, he seems to extricate himself of all the earlier accusation falling into an unresolved self-contradiction. However, along the text, he would resume the self-satiric tone and candidly point the finger at his own share of the deception.

The harvest was vast and glorious as Arabia fell one district after the other under the persistence of the rebels. Every one was pricked by pride for the massive achievement and the successes that precarious march managed to score against all the odds. The end was approaching and the

farce was breathing its lasts. While the victory was the sole concern, it was relatively easy to send his qualms into oblivion:

> We no doubt enjoyed more the rare moments of peace and forgetfulness; but I remember more the agony, the terrors, and the mistakes. Our life is not summed up in what I have written (there are things not to be repeated in cold blood for very shame); but what I have written was in and of our life. Pray God that men reading the story will not, for love of the glamour of strangeness, go out to *prostitute* themselves and their talents in serving another race. (P. 29).

What is interesting in the above piece is the way Lawrence metaphorically describes his efforts in the Arabian front as *prostitution*. In the same vein, he talks about agony and terror that the experience generated compared to rare moments of peace and forgetfulness. So, while the pursuit is crowned with success and espoused with glory and glamour, Lawrence's feeling was very far from glorious. It was a feeling of abject disgrace of his exertions. Yet, his aim is to quit himself of the blame relapsing into self-deception. Lawrence *prostituted* his talents in Arabia but in the service of Britain not the Arabs. Later, he plumbs deeper to test a theory of his, which he, shortly after, espoused:

> Or was this shame, too, a self-abnegation, to be admitted and admired for its own sake? How was it right to let men die because they did not understand? Blindness and folly aping the way of right were punished more heavily than purposed evil, at least in the present consciousness and remorse of man alive. (p. 568)

Encoded in the interrogative, these meditations are charged with incertitude. Up to the moment of writing, the speaker has not yet arrived at a sure conclusion, hence the interrogative structures. These reflections show

among many other things the kind of personality that the Arabian experience has yielded. While, his fellow countrymen celebrated his success and rewarded his persistence, inwardly he was wallowing in shame and remorse. Admittance takes courage and self-denial albeit he could not assign any of his shame to neither his country nor the people who were one way or another his accomplices.

These speculations, however, are personal attitudes and opinions that hold for the individual. Ideologies had not undergone transformation nor would be any time soon. Lawrence has seen the eclipse of them but only on a personal level, and he must eventually repair to security. The contemplative part of the book which monopolizes basically its introductory is contrived to acquit Lawrence of some of the burden and guilt. In the long run, it obviously made very little difference especially as the West has tended to appreciate the book mainly for its oriental and adventurous purport and misread it as the account in which Westerners might liberally take pride. It must be very shocking to observers to describe the British manipulation of the Arabian front as prostitution or to assign shame and disgrace to its master mind.

Coda

In the ideological study of Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Arab and English participants act on a level that forces them to compromise their different and at times opposed backgrounds. Both sides, under the partnership and camaraderie of the war and lethal strife, temporarily lay aside their prejudices and reservations or at least pretended so to attain their seemingly unified ends. The study of language features and choices in terms of syntax, semantics, pragmatics, etc offers insights into the ideological referentiality, which is not always transparent or conspicuous but rather subtle and disguised (see diagram (2) below).

The way Lawrence arranged his discourse in the **_Pillars_** borrows a lot from scientific and objective frameworks where a thesis is stated such as 'who the Arabs are'. Then, elaborative and detailed, long-winding arguments follow supported with cited evidences all in the guise of a neutral and historical account. Once the reader is intrigued, s/he would be caught by its informative impetuosity and would hardly question its eligibility or even validity.

His use of the pronouns is rather interesting as his **_we_** varies in reference between himself as British and himself as one of the Arab fighters. He managed to weld himself albeit outwardly with a race he used to have and still had misconceptions about. Once tested, a lot of what he held onto proved invalid and myopic.

In terms of Syntax, Lawrence always tampered with his statements. What is positive is clearly and actively marked and what is negative is passively voiced. Passive agency is often used to hide and cover sources of incompetence and inefficiency in relation to the British side of the game. Next to the passive voice, Lawrence spoke about changing realities only hypothetically through the use of conditional structures.
Most importantly his figurative language and the metaphorical twist with which he handles his words. Confronted with his duplicity, he does not dodge responsibility though he constantly fishes for excuses and justifications. The man prior to the experience would not have bothered to justify; the man post the experience, however, was dying to find desperate pretexts. The former excuses and makes allowances, the latter accuses and condemns. Somewhere between the two, a third personality is entrapped.

When he embarks on personal evaluation, his choice of vocabulary is all diplomacy and political awareness. Nothing he could say in honesty that would not backfire by infuriating one party or the other. Hence, he opted for self-blame and self-shame instead, a matter that eventually compromised all without exception.

Diagram (2): Lawrence's Ideological Strategies and their Functions

No	Strategy	Function
1	Syntax: Passive Voice Pseudo-cleft Agency: we, I, they	Glossing over one's group defects, Enlarging the other group's shortcomings, Assign mistakes to unidentified sources.
2	Rhetoric: Figures of speech (metaphor)	Seemingly used for illustrative reasons, but helps set off contrasts and comparisons
3	Pragmatics: Speech acts Unidentified speech agency	Dim off the fraudulent agency. Disguise misjudgment, delinquency, inaccuracy, etc.
4	Dialogical interaction	Power, dominance and hegemony where the weak and less resourceful side is patronized by the more powerful one.
5	Lexicon : word choice	Duplicity and deceit are accompanied by such lexical items like remorse, shame, regret, and agony
6	Local Semantics	Blame-transfer (it was not wholly his fault, there are dominating powers, denial of knowledge of the fraudulence, admitting to knowledge gained too late, inability to withdraw, etc.

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